Molinism, Open Theism, and Moral Luck

Inman E. Page Library, Room 100, Lincoln University

It is sometimes thought that the choice between Molinism and open theism involves a trade-off in values: Molinism asserts that God has providential power but allows God indirectly to manipulate that in virtue of which human beings are to be judged; while open theism grants human beings more power over that in virtue of which they are tp be judged, but at the price of giving up providence. I argue here that this picture is misconstrued---that Molinism gives human agents more power over that in virtue of which they may be judged than does open theism. Since open theism confines the possible avenues for evaluating agents to their behavior in the actual world, open theism is incompatible with any solution to the problem of moral luck which appeals to counterfactual behavior, and so (I argue) is impugned by the problem,. Molinists, by contrast, have a promising solution to that problem.